cover image: The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

Premium

20.500.12592/6bb3r4

The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

1994

Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
security, international nuclear crisis control deterrence (strategy) nuclear crisis stability

Authors

Frank P. Harvey

Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Control Number Identifier
CaOOCEL
Dewey Decimal Classification Number
355.02/17
General Note
Issued as part of the desLibris books collection
ISBN
9780773566569 0773516069
LCCN
U264
LCCN Item number
H368 1997eb
Modifying agency
CaBNVSL
Original cataloging agency
CaOONL
Physical Description | Extent
1 electronic text (xvi, 192 p.)
Published in
Canada
Publisher or Distributor Number
CaOOCEL
Rights
Access restricted to authorized users and institutions
System Control Number
(CaBNVSL)slc00200641 (CaBNVSL)slc00200641 (CaBNVSL) (CaBNVSL)gtp00523324 (OCoLC)144084347 (CaOOCEL)400824
System Details Note
Mode of access: World Wide Web
Transcribing agency
CaOONL

Table of Contents