Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another.
The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
Authors
- Bibliography, etc. Note
- Includes bibliographical references and index
- Control Number Identifier
- CaOOCEL
- Dewey Decimal Classification Number
- 355.02/17
- General Note
- Issued as part of the desLibris books collection
- ISBN
- 9780773566569 0773516069
- LCCN
- U264
- LCCN Item number
- H368 1997eb
- Modifying agency
- CaBNVSL
- Original cataloging agency
- CaOONL
- Physical Description | Extent
- 1 electronic text (xvi, 192 p.)
- Published in
- Canada
- Publisher or Distributor Number
- CaOOCEL
- Rights
- Access restricted to authorized users and institutions
- System Control Number
- (CaBNVSL)slc00200641 (CaBNVSL)slc00200641 (CaBNVSL) (CaBNVSL)gtp00523324 (OCoLC)144084347 (CaOOCEL)400824
- System Details Note
- Mode of access: World Wide Web
- Transcribing agency
- CaOONL
Table of Contents
- Contents 8
- Tables and Figures 10
- Acknowledgments 12
- Introduction 14
- 1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions 20
- 2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing 36
- 3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing 64
- 4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948–88 73
- 5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence 111
- 6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War 129
- 7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War 138
- Notes 162
- Bibliography 188
- Index 206
- A 206
- B 206
- C 206
- D 207
- E 207
- F 207
- G 207
- H 207
- I 207
- J 207
- K 207
- L 207
- M 208
- N 208
- O 208
- P 208
- R 208
- S 208
- T 209
- V 209
- W 209
- Y 209
- Z 209